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Abstract 
  
We analyze the effects of monetary policy on economic activity in the proposed 
African monetary unions. Findings  broadly show that: (1) but for financial efficiency in the 
EAMZ,  monetary policy variables affect output neither in the short-run nor in the long-term 
and; (2) with the exception of financial size that impacts inflation in the EAMZ in the short-
term, monetary policy variables generally have no effect on prices in the  short-run. The 
WAMZ may not use policy instruments to offset adverse shocks to output by pursuing either 
an expansionary or a contractionary policy, while the EAMZ can do with the ‘financial 
allocation efficiency’ instrument. Policy implications are discussed.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
 In the current geo-economic climate of Europe, it is clear that the spectre of the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) crisis is looming substantially and scarring potential 
monetary zones. With renewed interest in the economics of monetary union due to the 
ensuing EMU crisis, very few studies have examined the feasibility of the proposed African 
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monetary unions (Tsangarides and Qureshi, 2008; Asongu, 2012a; Asongu, 2012b; Alagidede 
et al., 2011). Accordingly, there is scanty empirical evidence on studies focusing on the 
proposed West African Monetary Zone: WAMZ (Debrun et al., 2005; Celasun and Justiniano, 
2005). This is also unfortunately the case with the embryonic East African Monetary Zone: 
EAMZ (Mkenda, 2001; Buigut and Valev, 2005). These studies have focused on the costs and 
benefits of candidate countries (Debrun et al., 2005), optimality of proposed currency unions 
(Mkenda, 2001; Asongu, 2012a; Buigut and Valev, 2005) and adjustment to shocks (Celasun 
and Justiniano, 2005; Alagidede et al., 2011; Asongu, 2012b). The conclusions of the studies 
overwhelmingly have one common denominator: the need for greater improvement in 
structural and institutional characteristics that ease convergence in monetary policy. As it has 
been substantially documented, a paramount lesson of the EMU crisis is that serious 
disequilibria in a monetary union result from arrangements not designed to be robust to a 
variety of shocks (Willet, 2011; Willet and Srisorn, 2011; Asongu, 2012a). In light of the 
above, little is known about the potential effect of monetary policy on economic activity in 
the proposed African monetary unions.  
 Another strand motivating the scope and positioning of the current study is traceable 
to open issues in the monetary policy debate. Firstly, while in large industrial economies, 
changes in monetary policy affect real economic activity in the short-run (but only prices in 
the long-run), in transition (and developing) countries, the question of whether monetary 
policy variables affect output in the short-term is open to debate (Starr, 2005).  
Secondly, evidence of real effects in developed economies is supportive of the idea 
that monetary policy can be used to counter aggregate shocks. Economic theory traditionally 
suggests that money affects the business cycle but not the long-term potential real output: 
indicating that monetary policy is neutral in the long-term. In spite of the theoretical and 
empirical consensus on this long-run neutrality (Lucas, 1980; Olekalns, 1996; Sarletis and 
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Koustas, 1998; Bernanke and Mihov, 1998; Bullard, 1999; Gerlach and Svensson, 2003; Bae 
et al., 2005; Nogueira, 2009), the role of money as an informational variable for decision 
making has remained open to debate (Roffia and Zaghini, 2008; Nogueira, 2009; Bhaduri and 
Durai, 2012)
1
.  
Thirdly, the potential for using monetary policy to affect real prices is also less clear. 
For instance, in countries that have experienced substantial inflation or in which labor markets 
are chronically slack, prices and wages are unlikely to be particularly sticky so that monetary 
policy changes could pass quickly via prices and have very feeble real effects (Gagnon and 
Ihrig, 2004). In addition, the globalization of financial markets undercut the potential of 
independent policy by significantly dissipating the ability of small-open economies to 
determine interest rates independently of world markets (Dornbusch, 2001; Frankel et al., 
2004).   
 In light of the above debate, five challenges are central in the literature. Firstly, with 
the EMU crisis looming, understanding how monetary policy would affect economic activity 
in the embryonic African monetary zones is a key concern in scholarly and policy making 
circles. On a second note, the extent to which monetary policy influences output in the short-
run and prices in the distant future in developing countries remains an open debate. Hence, 
this assessment is a relevant contribution to the scholarly and policy debate on how money 
matters in economic activity. Thirdly, but for a few exceptions (Moosa, 1997; Bae and Ratti, 
2000; Starr, 2005; Nogueira, 2009), the literature on the long-run economic significance of 
money has abundantly focused on developed countries. Evidence provided by these studies 
may not be relevant for African countries because of asymmetric financial fundamentals. For 
instance, financial depth (liquid liabilities) is (are) not equal to money supply in African 
                                                 
1
 As a matter of fact, empirical literature reveals mixed results and the outcomes are contingent on selected 
countries and historical periods under investigation (Dwyer and Hafer, 1999; Stock and Watson, 1999; Trecroci 
and Vega-Croissier, 2000; Leeper and Roush, 2002; Bae et al., 2005). 
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countries because a great proportion of the monetary base does not transit via the banking 
sector (Asongu, 2012a).  
Fourthly, the empirical investigation that has concentrated on monetary aggregates has 
failed to take account of other proxies that are consistently exogenous to money supply. For 
example, other financial intermediary aggregates of efficiency (at banking and financial 
system levels), activity (from banking and financial system perspectives), and size (credit of 
the banking sector in relation to that of the financial system) substantially affect the velocity 
of money. Hence, the hitherto unemployed variables could also logically have an incidence on 
the effectiveness of monetary policy. Moreover, financial allocation efficiency is a serious 
issue in African countries because of surplus liquidity issues and limited financial activity 
(Saxegard, 2006; Fouda, 2009). Fifthly, soaring food prices that have recently marked the 
geopolitical landscape of Africa has come without short-run adequate monetary measures to 
stem the rising price tide
2
. This paper therefore aims to tackle the challenges highlighted 
above in a fivefold contribution to existing literature.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews existing literature with 
particular emphasis on the theory, debate, scope and positioning of the paper. The model 
presented in Section 3 first entails a brief highlight on the intuition motivating the empirics, 
then discusses the methodology before presenting the data. Empirical results are presented in 
Section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2.  Literature review  
 
 The debate on monetary policy can be classified into two main strands: the traditional 
discretionary monetary policy and the non-traditional policy regimes. In the first strand, there 
has been a wealth of discussion on the rewards of shifting from traditional discretionary 
monetary policy arrangements in recent years (such as inflation targeting, monetary unions, 
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 According to the Director General of the International Food Policy Research Institute, monetary and exchange 
rate responses were not effective in addressing food inflation (Von Braun, 2008).  
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dollarization…etc). A favorable prospect of discretionary policy is that the monetary authority 
can use policy instruments to offset adverse shocks to output by pursuing a contractionary 
policy when output is above its potential or an expansionary policy when output is below its 
potential. For example, in the latter situation a policy-controlled interest rate can be lowered 
as a measure of reducing interest rate and stimulating spending. On the contrary, a monetary 
expansion that depreciates the real exchange rate may improve the competiveness of the 
country’s products in domestic and world markets and hence, boost demand for national 
output (Starr, 2005). Moreover, a flexible countercyclical monetary policy can be practiced 
with inflation targeting (Ghironi and Rebucci, 2000; Mishkin, 2002). 
 The second strand concerns non-traditional policy regimes which limit the ability of 
the monetary authorities to use policy to offset output fluctuations. In fact, the degree to 
which a particular country can use monetary policy to affect output in the short-run is a matter 
of debate. Some studies in the US are consistent with the fact that a decline in the key interest 
rate controlled by the Federal Reserve tends to increase output over the next two to three 
years. However, this effect dissipates thereafter and the long-run incidence is limited to prices 
(Starr, 2005). Many studies have investigated whether this US tendency of ‘short-term effect 
of monetary policy’ is similar in other countries. Results have been mixed at best in seventeen 
industrialized countries (Hayo, 1999). Regardless of the measurement of money used, a study 
on two middle-income countries has found no evidence of Granger-causality flowing from 
money to output (Agénor et al., 2000).  
From an interest rate standpoint, while Hafer and Kutan (2002) find that it generally 
plays a relatively more important role in explaining output in twenty OECD countries, Ganev 
et al. (2002) do not find such evidence in Central and Eastern Europe. Weeks (2010) asserts 
that the great emphasis placed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on monetary policy 
in its programmes for developing countries (especially sub-Saharan Africa: SSA) as absurdly 
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inappropriate since the vast majority of governments in SSAfrican countries lack the 
instruments to make monetary policy effective
3
. Investigating this sentiment in the context of 
the embryonic African monetary zones is worthwhile.  
 We also devote space to discussing existing literature on the EAMZ and the WAMZ. 
To the best of our knowledge, only three studies have focused on the EAMZ. Mkenda (2001) 
has employed a Generalized Purchasing Power Parity (GPPP) model to analyze the suitability 
of the EAC (East African Community) for a single currency union. Findings indicate that the 
real exchange rates between the EAC countries are cointegrated (during the period 1980-
1998) and further suggest that the EAMZ could be an optimal currency area. The limitation 
however in this approach (as pointed-out by Buigut and Valev (2005)) is that movements in 
macroeconomic variables reflect the combined effects of shocks and responses (Angeloni and 
Dedola, 1999).  
With a methodology that distinguishes errors from responses, Buigut and Valev (2005) 
assess the suitability of the East African countries for a regional monetary union by testing for 
symmetry in the underlying structural shocks. The results suggest that the supply and demand 
shocks are asymmetric for the most part, which does not support the forming a single 
currency union. However, owing to cross-country similarities in the speed and magnitude of 
adjustment to shocks, Buigut and Valev stress that further integration of the economies could 
lead to favorable conditions for a monetary union. A position shared by Asongu (2012a).   
 Some studies have also exclusively focused on analyzing the feasibility of forming a 
monetary union in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Celasun 
and Justiniano (2005) have used a dynamic factor analysis to assess the synchronization of 
output fluctuations among candidate countries. Their findings indicate that small member 
                                                 
3
 The IMF views monetary policy as crucial in managing inflation and stabilizing exchange rates. Weeks posits 
that SSA lacks two main channels for implementing monetary policy: (1) trying to influence the creation of 
private credit through so-called open market operations or; (2) seeking to influence the borrowing rates for 
private sector by adjusting the interest rate at which commercial banks can borrow from the central bank.  
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states within ECOWAS experience relatively more synchronized output variations. In effect, 
they suggest that a monetary unification among subsets of countries is preferable over wider 
monetary integration. Using a model of monetary and fiscal interactions, Debrun et al. (2005) 
also have investigated the potential for monetary integration in the ECOWAS. Their findings 
suggest that the proposed union is promising for most non-‘West African Economic and 
Monetary Union’ (WAEMU) countries but not for the existing WAEMU member states.  
Using hard and soft clustering algorithms to a set of variables suggested by the 
convergence criteria and the theory of optimal currency areas, Tsangarides and Qureshi 
(2008) have also assessed the suitability of the WAMZ. Findings show significant 
dissimilarities in the economic characteristics of member countries. Very recently, Alagidede 
et al. (2011) have assessed the inflation dynamics and common trend in the real domestic 
product of candidate countries for the embryonic WAMZ. Using fractional integration and 
cointegration methods, they have found significant heterogeneity among the countries. Their 
results are consistent with those of Asongu (2012a) that has focused on real, monetary and 
fiscal policy convergence.  
In light of the above, one common denominator clearly stands out: the need for greater 
improvement in structural and institutional characteristics that ease convergence in monetary 
policy. Accordingly, a paramount lesson of the EMU crisis is that serious disequilibria in a 
monetary union result from arrangements not designed to be robust to a variety of shocks 
(Willet, 2011; Willet and Srisorn, 2011; Asongu, 2012a). Hence, the present study 
complements existing literature by assessing the equilibria of monetary policy and economic 
activity (output and inflation) in the proposed African monetary unions.  
 
3. The Model  
  
 While there is a wealth of empirical studies on the effects of monetary policy on 
economic activity based on traditional monetary variable (money supply, private credit, 
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borrowing rates…etc), there is yet (as far as we know) no employment of fundamental 
financial intermediary performance indicators (that are exogenous to money supply) in the 
assessment of ‘monetary policy effects’ on output and prices. With this fact in mind, we are 
conscious of the risks of ‘doing measurement without past empirical bases and argue that, 
‘reporting facts within the framework of an outstanding theoretical model, even in the 
absence of past supporting studies is a useful scientific activity’. In addition, applied 
econometrics has other missions than the mere validation or refutation of economic theories 
with existing expositions and/or prior analytical frameworks (Asongu, 2012c; Asongu, 
2012d). Hence, it is relevant to highlight the economic/monetary intuition motivating the use 
of hitherto unemployed financial intermediary development fundamentals.  
 From a broad dimension, money supply can be understood in terms of financial depth, 
financial allocation efficiency, financial activity and financial size.  (1) Financial intermediary 
depth could be defined both from an overall economic standpoint and a financial system 
perspective. This distinction, as will be elucidated in the data section is worth discussing to 
elaborate detail because, unlike the developed world, in developing countries a great chunk of 
the monetary base does not transit through the banking sector (Asongu, 2012c). (2) Financial 
allocation efficiency (from banking and financial system positions) that reflects the fulfillment 
of the fundamental role of financial institutions (in transforming mobilized deposits into credit 
for economic operators) could also intuitively be conceived as the ability of banks to increase 
the velocity of money. (3) Financial activity (observed from banking and financial system 
perspectives) mirrors the ability of financial institutions to grant credit to economic operators.  
(4) Financial size (deposit bank assets/total assets) indicates the credit allocated by banking 
institutions as a proportion of total assets in the financial system (deposit bank assets plus 
central bank assets). Hence, the above four categories of aggregate financial intermediary 
fundamentals are intuitively exogenous to money supply and monetary policy.  
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 In accordance with the postulation of Weeks (2010) on the inherent ineffectiveness of 
monetary policy in African countries discussed above, the insights from the ‘Blinder credit-
rationing model’ are useful in further motivating the intuition for the African empirics.  
Consistent with Blinder (1987), a rethinking of novel monetary policy dynamics is needed at 
times: “The reader should understand that this is merely an expositional device. I would not 
wish to deny that the interest elasticity and expectational error mechanisms have some 
validity. But the spirit of this paper is that those mechanisms do not seem important enough to 
explain the deep recessions that are apparently caused by central bank policy” (p. 2). In 
recent memory, this postulation by Blinder is even more relevant because existing monetary 
and exchange rate responses have not been effective in addressing the recent food inflation 
(Von Braun, 2008). 
In light of the literature covered in Section 2 and above motivation, the following 
hypotheses will be tested.  
Hypothesis 1: Monetary policy variables affect prices in the long-run but not in the short-run 
in the proposed monetary zones. 
Hypothesis 2: Monetary policy variables influence output in the short-term but not in the 
long-term in the proposed monetary zones. 
The estimation technique typically follows mainstream literature on testing the short-
run effects of monetary policy variables on output and prices (Starr, 2005) and the long-run 
neutrality of monetary policy (Nogueira, 2009). The approach involves unit root and 
cointegration tests that assess the stationary properties and long-term relationships 
(equilibriums) respectively. In these assessments, the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) 
is applied for long-run effects whereas simple Granger causality is used for short-term effects 
in the absence of cointegration. While application of the former model requires that the 
variables exhibit unit roots in levels (and have a long-run relationship (cointegration)), the 
10 
 
latter is applied on the condition that the variables are stationary (or do not exhibit unit roots). 
Impulse response functions are used to further assess the tendencies of significant Granger 
causality findings.  
For long-run causality, let us consider ‘economic activity’ (y) and money (x), such 
that: 
y
tptyxptyxptyyptyyyt vxxyyy    ....... 11110                                              (1) 
x
tptxxptxxptxyptxyxt vxxyyx    ....... 11110                                               (2) 
 
We adopt the subscript convention that βxyp denotes the coefficient of economic activity(y) in 
the equation for money (x) at lag p. Since we are dealing with a bivariate analysis, the two 
equations above are replicated for economic activity (output and inflation) and each monetary 
policy variable. The error terms in the two equations represent the parts of yt and xt that are 
not related to past values of the two variables. The intuition motivating the exogeneity of the 
monetary policy variables has already been discussed in the data section.  In event the output 
variable and monetary policy indicators of the VAR are cointegrated, we use the following 
vector error-correction (VEC) to estimate short-run adjustments to the long-run equilibrium. 
Otherwise we proceed by simple Granger causality (Engle & Granger, 1987).  
  yttàtyptyptyptyptyyt vxyxxyyy   11111110 .......     (3) 
  xttàtxptxptxptxptxxt vxyxxyyx   11111110 .......       (4) 
where  
tt xy 10     
is the long-run equilibrium relationship between the two variables and 
y and x are the error-correction parameters that measure how y (economic activity) and x 
(money) react to deviations from the long-run equilibrium. Accordingly, at equilibrium the 
value of the error correction term (ECT) is zero. When this term is non-zero, it means 
economic activity and money have deviated from the long term relationship. Therefore, the 
ECT helps each variable to adjust and partially restore the equation (cointegration) 
relationship. Eqs (1) to (4) shall be replicated for all pairs of economic activity and monetary 
policy (depth, efficiency, activity and size). Goodness of fit (in model specification) is based 
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on the AIC
4
 (Liew, 2004) and the same deterministic trend assumptions used for the 
cointegration tests are applied.  
The VAR is also a natural framework for examining Granger causality. Let us again 
consider the two variable system in Eqs (1) and (2). Eq. (1) models yt (economic activity) as a 
linear function of its own past values plus past values of x (money). If money Granger causes 
economic activity, then some or all of the lagged x values have non-zero effects: lagged x 
affects yt conditional on the effects of lagged y. It follows that testing for Granger causality in 
Eqs (1) and (2) amounts to testing the joint blocks of coefficients to see if they are zero or not.  
Hence, the null hypothesis of Eq. (1) is the position that money does not Granger cause 
economic activity. Therefore, a rejection of this null hypothesis is captured by the significant 
F-statistics, which is the Wald statistics for the joint hypothesis that estimated parameters of 
lagged values equal zero. Accordingly, optimal lag selection for goodness of fit is consistent 
with the recommendations of Liew (2004).  Whereas in mainstream literature the Granger 
causality model is applied on variables that are mostly stationary in levels, within the 
framework of this study, we are also applying this test to all pairs in ‘first difference’ 
equations for three reasons: (1) consistency with application of the model to stationary 
variables; (2) ensure comparability; and; (3) robustness checks in case we might have missed-
out something in the unit root test specifications.  
We investigate 4 West and 5 East African countries with data from African 
Development Indicators (ADI) and the Financial Development and Structure Database 
(FDSD) of the World Bank for the period 1980-2010. Guinea is left-out of the WAMZ due to 
constraints in data availability. Summary statistics and details of the countries are presented in 
Panel A and Panel B respectively of Table 1. The definition of the variables and 
corresponding sources are presented in Table 2. In line with the literature, the dependent 
                                                 
4
 Akaike Information Criterion.  
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variables are measured in terms of annual percentage change in the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) and real GDP output (Bordo and Jeanne, 2002; Bae et al., 2005; Hendrix et al., 2009).  
For clarity in presentation, the independent variables are discussed in terms of 
financial depth (money), financial activity (credit), financial allocation efficiency and 
financial size. Firstly, from a financial depth standpoint, the study is consistent with the 
FDSD and recent African finance literature (Asongu, 2013a; Asongu, 2013b) in measuring 
financial depth both from overall-economic and financial system perspectives with indicators 
of broad money supply (M2/GDP) and financial system deposits (Fdgdp) respectively. 
Whereas the former denotes the monetary base (M0) plus demand, saving and time deposits, 
the latter represents liquid liabilities (or deposits) of the financial system. It is imperative to 
distinguish these two aggregates of money supply because since we are dealing exclusively 
with developing countries, a great chunk of the monetary base does not transit via formal 
banking institutions.  
Secondly, credit is appreciated in terms of financial intermediary activity. Therefore, 
the study seeks to lay emphasis on the ability of banks to grant credit to economic operators.  
We proxy both for banking-system-activity and financial-system-activity with “private 
domestic credit by deposit banks: Pcrb” and “private credit by deposit banks and other 
financial institutions: Pcrbof” respectively. Thirdly, financial size is measured in terms of 
deposit bank assets (credit) as a proportion of total assets (deposit bank assets plus central 
bank assets).  
Fourthly, financial efficiency
5
 appreciates the ability of deposits (money) to be 
transformed into credit (financial activity). This fourth indicator measures the fundamental 
role of banks in transforming mobilized deposits into credit for economic operators. We take 
into account indicators of banking-system-efficiency and financial-system-efficiency 
                                                 
5
 By financial efficiency in this context, we neither refer to the profitability-related concept (notion) nor to the 
production efficiency of decision making units in the financial sector (through Data Envelopment Analysis: 
DEA). 
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(respectively ‘bank credit on bank deposits: Bcbd’ and ‘financial system credit on financial 
system deposits: Fcfd’). The correlation matrices presented in Table 3 show that (but for 
financial size) the two measures adopted for each financial dynamic can be used to robustly 
check one another because of their high degrees of substitution.  
The choice of the monetary policy variables is broadly consistent with the empirical 
underpinnings of recent African monetary (Asongu, 2013c) and finance (Asongu, 2013d) 
literature. Accordingly, we are not the first to think out of the box when it comes to the 
empirics of monetary policy. Blinder (1987) in assessing the effects of monetary policy on 
economic activity completely banished interest rate elasticities: “In order to make credit 
rationing mechanism stand out in bold relief, most other channels of monetary policy (such as 
interest elasticities and expectational errors) are banished from the model” (p. 2). The 
financial fundamentals entail all the dimensions identified by the Financial Development and 
Structure Database (FDSD) of the World Bank (WB). 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics and Presentation of Countries  
             
   Panel A: Summary Statistics 
   West  African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) East African Monetary Zone (EAMZ) 
   Mean S.D Min. Max. Obser. Mean S.D Min. Max. Obser. 
Economic   
Activity  
Inflation  20.191 21.081 0.844 122.8 97 17.218 31.302 -100.0 200.03 153 
Real  Output  9.521 0.855 8.248 11.31 124 9.581 0.456 8.774 10.49 147 
 
 
 
Finance 
Fin. 
Depth  
M2 0.226 0.116 0.091 0.796 114 0.224 0.118 0.046 0.498 134 
Fdgdp 0.154 0.093 0.045 0.600 114 0.171 0.110 0.026 0.414 134 
Fin. 
Efficiency 
BcBd 0.625 0.347 0.173 2.103 117 0.676 0.282 0.070 1.609 146 
FcFd 0.629 0.326 0.209 1.812 114 0.819 0.357 0.139 1.968 134 
Fin. 
Activity  
Pcrb 0.096 0.066 0.014 0.350 114 0.112 0.074 0.011 0.255 134 
Pcrbof  0.099 0.068 0.014 0.368 114 0.137 0.097 0.011 0.349 134 
Fin. Size Dbacba 0.502 0.273 0.054 1.350 117 0.628 0.198 0.110 0.999 141 
             
   Panel B: Presentation of countries 
 
West  African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone 
East African Monetary Zone (EAMZ) Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania 
             
S.D: Standard  Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obser: Observations. Fin: Financial. M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid 
liabilities. BcBd: Bank credit on Bank deposits. FcFd: Financial system credit on financial system deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit by 
deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on Total Assets 
(Deposit bank assets plus Central bank assets).  
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Table 2: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions Sources 
    
Inflation   Infl. Consumer Price Index (Annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Real Output  Output  Logarithm of Real GDP World Bank (WDI) 
    
Economic financial depth 
(Money Supply) 
M2 Monetary Base plus demand, saving and time 
deposits (% of GDP) 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial system depth (Liquid 
liabilities) 
Fdgdp Financial system deposits (% of GDP)   World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking system allocation 
efficiency 
BcBd Bank credit on Bank deposits World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial system allocation 
efficiency 
FcFd Financial system credit on Financial system deposits  World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking system activity Pcrb Private credit by deposit banks (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial system activity Pcrbof Private credit by deposit banks and other financial 
institutions (% of GDP) 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking System Size  Dbacba  Deposit bank assets/ Total assets (Deposit bank assets 
plus Central bank assets) 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Infl: Inflation. M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid liabilities. BcBd: Bank credit on Bank deposits. FcFd: Financial system credit on Financial 
system deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit by deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions. 
WDI: World Development Indicators. FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  
 
 
Table 3: Correlation Matrices  
           
Panel A: West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) 
Economic Activity Financial Depth Fin. Efficiency Financial Activity F. Size  
Inflation Output M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba  
1.000 0.147 -0.277 -0.314 -0.163 -0.203 -0.352 -0.338 -0.493 Inflation 
 1.000 -0.175 -0.105 0.294 0.238 0.108 0.150 0.079 Output 
  1.000 0.990 0.020 0.022 0.646 0.634 0.478 M2 
   1.000 0.062 0.056 0.682 0.675 0.537 Fdgdp 
    1.000 0.966 0.746 0.745 0.528 BcBd 
     1.000 0.731 0.735 0.547 FcFd 
      1.000 0.994 0.780 Pcrb 
       1.000 0.766 Pcrbof 
        1.000 Dbacba 
           
Panel B: East African Monetary Zone (EAMZ) 
Economic Activity Financial Depth Fin. Efficiency Financial Activity F. Size  
Inflation Output M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba  
1.000 0.059 -0.212 -0.196 -0.215 -0.226 -0.225 -0.206 -0.210 Inflation 
 1.000 0.427 0.497 -0.447 -0.665 0.215 0.152 0.374 Output 
  1.000 0.989 0.148 0.010 0.893 0.912 0.583 M2 
   1.000 0.106 -0.057 0.884 0.900 0.576 Fdgdp 
    1.000 0.870 0.450 0.461 0.234 BcBd 
     1.000 0.278 0.344 0.079 FcFd 
      1.000 0.953 0.600 Pcrb 
       1.000 0.533 Pcrbof 
        1.000 Dbacba 
           
M2: Money Supply.  Fdgdp: Liquid liabilities. BcBd: Bank credit on Bank deposits (Banking System Efficiency). FcFd: Financial credit on 
Financial deposits (Financial System Efficiency). Pcrb: Private credit by deposit banks (Banking System Activity). Pcrbof: Private credit 
from deposit banks and other financial institutions (Financial System Activity). Dbacba: Deposit bank asset on Total assets (Banking system 
size). Fin: Financial. 
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4. Empirical Results 
 
The examination of stationary properties is based on two types of (first generation) 
panel unit root tests.  When the variables exhibit unit roots in levels, we assess the stationary 
properties in their first differences. Employment of the Granger causality approach requires 
that the variables are stationary (or do not have a unit root). Two main types of panel unit root 
tests have been documented: the first generation (that is contingent on cross-sectional 
independence) and the second generation (which supposes cross-sectional dependence). A 
necessary condition for the use of the latter generation test is a cross-sectional dependence test 
that is only applicable if the number of cross-sections (N) in the panel is above the number of 
periods in the cross-sections (T). Given that we have 31 periods (T) and 5 and/or 4 cross-
sections (N), we are limited to first generation types.  
Thus, both the Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC, 2002) and Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS, 2003) 
tests are employed. While the former is a homogenous based panel unit root test (with a 
common unit as null hypothesis), the latter is a heterogeneous oriented test (with individual 
unit roots as null hypotheses). In case of conflicting results, IPS (2003) takes precedence over 
LLC (2002) in decision making because in line with Maddala and Wu (1999), the alternative 
hypothesis of LLC (2002) is too strong. Consistent with Liew (2004), goodness of fit (or 
optimal lag selection) for model specification is ensured by the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) and the Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion (HQC) for the IPS (2003) and LLC 
(2002) tests respectively.  
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Table 4: Panel unit root tests 
           
  Panel A: Unit root tests for the WAMZ 
  LLC tests for homogenous panel 
  F. Depth (Money) Fin.  Efficiency F. Activity (Credit) F. Size  Inflation Output 
  M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba   (CPI) GDP 
Level c 0.879 1.252 -0.738 -2.89*** 2.150 2.142 3.028 -5.58*** 3.229 
ct -0.828 0.200 0.691 -0.125 2.390 2.612 0.047 -5.86*** -1.024 
First 
difference 
c -5.01*** -2.81*** -6.65*** -3.80*** -2.10** -1.130 -8.82*** n.a -6.61*** 
ct -3.58*** -4.14*** -6.20*** -3.46*** -2.82*** -2.30** -4.57*** n.a -6.49*** 
           
  IPS tests for heterogeneous panel 
  F. Depth (Money) Fin.  Efficiency F. Activity (Credit) F. Size  Inflation Output 
  M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba   (CPI) GDP 
Level c 0.103 0.647 0.101 -1.52* 2.513 2.398 1.844 -9.22*** 3.865 
ct -0.828 -0.121 1.616 -1.34* 3.685 3.840 -0.799 -4.25*** -0.159 
First 
difference 
c -6.47*** -4.71*** -6.79*** -4.10*** -3.33*** -2.39*** -9.36*** n.a -7.36*** 
ct -5.54*** -5.52*** -6.42*** -3.86*** -3.15*** -2.98*** -9.05*** n.a -7.93*** 
           
  Panel B: Unit root tests for the EAMZ 
  LLC tests for homogenous panel 
  F. Depth (Money) Fin.  Efficiency F. Activity (Credit) F. Size  Inflation Output 
  M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba   (CPI) GDP 
Level c 4.969 5.386 -0.461 -0.774 2.478 2.009 0.912 -0.770 1.459 
ct 3.126 2.463 0.304 1.517 2.778 2.631 0.566 -0.016 1.730 
First 
difference 
c -3.36*** -2.86*** -9.25*** -1.86** -0.135 -2.80*** -9.67*** -5.23*** -7.03*** 
ct -3.74*** -3.08*** -9.10*** 1.054 -0.888 -6.60*** -4.63*** -2.55*** -5.40*** 
           
  IPS tests for heterogeneous panel 
  F. Depth (Money) Fin.  Efficiency F. Activity (Credit) F. Size  Inflation Output 
  M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba   (CPI) GDP 
Level c 4.028 5.061 -1.324* -1.70** 2.234 1.817 1.192 -2.86*** 2.358 
ct 2.126 2.289 0.002 -2.49*** -0.227 -0.430 0.260 -2.28** -0.026 
First 
difference 
c -3.71*** -3.66*** -8.73*** n.a -3.16*** -3.62*** -10.7*** n.a -6.88*** 
ct -3.29*** -3.20*** -8.94*** n.a -3.26*** -4.95*** -6.15*** n.a -4.80*** 
           
Notes: ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. ‘c’ and ‘ct’: ‘constant’ and ‘constant and trend’ respectively. 
Maximum lag is 8 and optimal lags are chosen with the HQC for LLC test and the AIC for IPS test. LLC: Levin, Lin & Chu (2002). IPS: Im, 
Pesaran & Shin (2003).  M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid Liabilities. BcBd: Banking System Efficiency. FcFd: Financial System 
Efficiency. Pcrb: Banking System Activity. Pcrbof: Financial System Activity. Dbacba: Deposit Bank Assets on Total Assets. CPI: 
Consumer Price Index. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. 
 
Table 4 above shows results for the panel unit root tests. Whereas Panel A presents the 
findings for the WAMZ, those of Panel B are for the EAMZ. For both monetary zones, while 
the financial variables and ‘real output’ are overwhelmingly integrated in the first order (i.e: 
they can be differenced once to be stationary), inflation is stationary in levels. These findings 
indicate the possibility of cointegration (long-run equilibrium) among the financial variables 
and real output; because, in line with the Engel-Granger theorem, two variables that are not 
stationary may have a linear combination in the long-run (Engle and Granger, 1987). 
Consistent with the cointegration theory, two (or more) variables that have a unit root 
in level series may have a linear combination (equilibrium) in the long-run. In principle, if 
two variables are cointegrated, it implies that permanent movements of one variable affect 
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permanent changes in the other variable. In order to examine the potential long-run 
relationships, we test for cointegration using the Engle-Granger based Pedroni test, which is a 
heterogeneous panel-based test. Whereas we have employed both homogenous and 
heterogeneous panel based unit roots tests in the previous section, we disagree with Camarero 
and Tamarit (2002) in applying a homogenous Engle-Granger based Kao panel cointegration 
test because, it has less deterministic assumptions. Accordingly, application of Kao (1999) in 
comparison to Pedroni (1999) presents substantial issues in deterministic components
6
. 
Similar deterministic trend assumptions employed in the IPS (2003) unit root test are used in 
the Pedroni (1999) heterogeneous cointegration tests. The choice of bivariate analysis 
(statistics) has a twofold advantage (justification): on the one hand, it is consistent with the 
problem statements (or testable hypotheses) and on the other hand, it mitigates 
misspecification issues in causality estimations
7
.  
 
 
                                                 
6
 Whereas Pedroni (1999) is employed in the presence of both ‘constant’ and ‘constant and trend’, Kao (1999) is 
based only on the former assumption (constant).  
7
 For example, multivariate cointegration and corresponding error correction model may involve variables that 
do not exhibit a unit root in levels (See Gries et al., 2009).  
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Table 5: Bivariate heterogeneous Pedroni Engle-Granger based panel cointegration tests for the WAMZ and the EAMZ 
               
 Panel A: Cointegration between Monetary Policy and Output for the WAMZ 
 Financial Depth (Money) & Output Financial Allocation Efficiency & Output Financial Activity (Credit) & Output Fin. Size & Output 
 Money  Supply Liquid Liability Banking System Financial  System Banking Activity Financial Activity   
 c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct 
  Panel v-Stats 0.095 0.740 0.177 0.820 0.878 -0.188 0.531 -0.743 -0.422 0.977 -0.483 0.830 0.940 1.699** 
Panel rho-Stats 0.803 -0.657 0.592 -0.720 -0.323 0.599 -0.194 0.815 0.976 -0.830 1.044 -0.729 -1.068 -0.573 
Panel PP-Stats 1.241 -1.415* 0.967 -1.466* 0.108 0.308 -0.013 0.388 1.270 -2.09** 1.350 -2.05** -0.902 -0.587 
Panel ADF-Stats 1.735 -1.265 1.432 -1.325* 0.779 0.852 0.399 0.690 1.215 -1.383* 1.348 -1.315* -0.900 -1.069 
               
Group rho-Stats 1.154 0.300 1.017 0.214 0.887 1.196 0.805 1.322 0.891 -0.046 0.988 0.005 -0.767 0.616 
Group PP-Stats 1.954 -0.832 1.657 -1.035 1.183 0.990 0.760 0.933 1.364 -2.18** 1.481 -2.231** -0.824 0.412 
Group ADF-Stats 2.730 -0.502 2.172 -0.761 1.955 1.735 1.203 1.282 1.346 -2.25** 1.506 -2.287** -0.704 -1.619* 
               
 Panel B: Cointegration between Monetary Policy and Output for the EAMZ 
 Financial Depth (Money) & Output  Financial Allocation Efficiency & Output Financial Activity (Credit) & Output Fin. Size & Output 
 Money  Supply Liquid Liability Banking System Financial  System Banking Activity Financial Activity   
 c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct 
  Panel v-Stats -0.505 1.397* -0.132 1.205 -0.729 1.970 n.a n.a -0.709 0.965 -0.209 1.562* 0.617 1.768** 
Panel rho-Stats 0.252 -0.203 -0.282 0.012 1.282 0.360 n.a n.a 1.501 0.964 0.012 0.355 -1.594* 0.150 
Panel PP-Stats 0.144 -1.284* -0.336 -0.896 1.634 -0.014 n.a n.a 2.027 0.899 0.034 0.199 -2.116** -0.154 
Panel ADF-Stats -0.295 -1.769** -0.612 -1.189 1.734 -0.532 n.a n.a 0.781 1.241 -0.186 0.583 -2.227** -0.644 
               
Group rho-Stats 0.517 0.699 0.408 0.889 1.591 1.216 n.a n.a 1.500 1.739 0.136 1.317 -0.426 0.831 
Group PP-Stats -0.154 -0.891 -0.262 -0.493 1.817 0.425 n.a n.a 1.983 1.419 0.086 0.775 -1.664** 0.011 
Group ADF-Stats -0.613 -0.957 -0.666 -0.511 2.062 -0.444 n.a n.a -0.121 1.020 0.039 0.824 -1.729** 0.049 
               
Notes: ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. ‘c’ and ‘ct’: ‘constant’ and ‘constant and trend’ respectively. Fin: Financial. PP: Phillips-Peron. ADF: Augmented Dickey Fuller. No deterministic 
trend assumption. WAMZ: West African Monetary Zone. EAMZ: East African Monetary Zone.  
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Table 5 above presents the cointegration results for monetary policy variables and 
output
8
. While Panel A presents those of the WAMZ, Panel B shows findings for the EAMZ. 
It could be observed that there is overwhelming support for the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration in both panels. These findings are broadly in line with the predictions of 
economic theory which show that, monetary policy has no incidence on real output in the 
long-run. In other words, the absence of a long-run relationship between monetary policy 
variables and output depicts the long-term neutrality of money.  It follows that permanent 
changes in financial intermediary dynamics (exogenous to monetary policy) do not affect 
permanent movements in real GDP output in the long-run in the proposed African monetary 
zones. Unfortunately, we are unable to establish whether permanent movements in monetary 
policy variables influence prices in the long-term because inflation is stationary in levels. Due 
to the absence of cointegration, we cannot proceed to estimate short-run adjustments to the 
long-run equilibrium with a VECM. Consistent with the Engle-Granger methodology, in the 
absence of cointegration, short-run effects can be estimated by simple Granger causality.  
 Table 6 below presents the Granger causality results. While Panel A shows findings of 
the WAMZ, Panel B reveals those of the EAMZ. Based on the findings of Panel A, it can be 
established that monetary policy variables have no short-term effect on real GDP output and 
inflation. Note should be taken of the fact that the significant finding of Granger causality 
flowing from financial size to inflation cannot be validated because financial size is stationary 
only in first difference (see Panel A of Table 4). The findings from Panel B show that 
financial efficiency Granger causes real GDP output and financial size Granger causes 
inflation.  
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Note should be taken of the fact that, inflation and financial system activity are not taken into account in the 
cointegration analysis because they are stationary. 
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Table 6: Short-run Granger causality analysis   
        
 Panel A: Monetary policy and Economic Activity for the WAMZ 
 Null Hypothesis: Monetary policy does not cause Real GDP Output 
 Financial Depth (Money) Financial  Efficiency Fin. Activity (Credit) Fin. Size 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
        
Levels 0.242 0.115 0.068 0.032 0.210 0.197 0.952 
        
 D[M2] D[Fdgdp] D[BcBd] D[FcFd] D[Pcrb] D[Pcrbof] D[Dbacba] 
        
1
st
  Difference 0.118 0.054 0.120 0.033 0.112 0.156 2.151 
        
        
 Null Hypothesis: Monetary policy does not cause Inflation 
 Financial Depth (Money) Financial  Efficiency Fin. Activity (Credit) Fin. Size 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
        
Levels 0.654 0.679 0.003 0.016 0.603 0.265 5.176*** 
        
 D[M2] D[Fdgdp] D[BcBd] D[FcFd] D[Pcrb] D[Pcrbof] D[Dbacba] 
        
1
st
  Difference 1.133 1.121 0.070 0.377 1.478 1.434 0.925 
        
        
 Panel B: Monetary policy and Economic Activity for the EAMZ 
 Null Hypothesis: Monetary policy does not cause Real GDP Output 
 Financial Depth (Money) Financial  Efficiency Fin. Activity (Credit) Fin. Size 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
        
Levels 0.175 0.163 3.387** 4.183** 0.368 1.338 0.581 
        
 D[M2] D[Fdgdp] D[BcBd] D[FcFd] D[Pcrb] D[Pcrbof] D[Dbacba] 
        
1
st
  Difference 1.486 1.357 0.764 3.256** 0.949 1.516 0.390 
        
        
 Null Hypothesis: Monetary policy does not cause Inflation 
 Financial Depth (Money) Financial  Efficiency Fin. Activity (Credit) Fin. Size 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
        
Levels 0.367 0.369 1.686 0.359 0.335 0.260 0.486 
        
 D[M2] D[Fdgdp] D[BcBd] D[FcFd] D[Pcrb] D[Pcrbof] D[Dbacba] 
        
1
st
  Difference 0.103 0.026 1.690 0.884 0.024 0.013 2.524* 
        
Null Hypothesis of Panel A: Monetary Policy does not Granger cause real GDP output. M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid liabilities. BcBd: 
Bank credit on Bank deposits (Banking System Efficiency). FcFd: Financial credit on Financial deposits (Financial System Efficiency). Pcrb: 
Private domestic credit (Banking System Activity). Pcrbof: Private credit from deposit banks and other financial institutions (Financial 
System Activity). Dbacba: Deposit bank asset on Total assets (Banking System Size). Fin: Financial. WAMZ: West African Monetary Zone. 
EAMZ: East African Monetary Zone. 
 
 Surprisingly (contrary to our expectation), monetary policy variables do not affect 
output in the short-term (as opposed to the situation in developed countries). The 
overwhelming absence of significant causalities flowing from monetary policy to inflation in 
the short-run is consistent with economic theory and in line with our expectations 
(hypotheses). For the few significant Granger causality results, the F-statistics upon which the 
conclusions are based cannot be used to draw any economic inferences. Hence, the impulse-
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response functions of such relationships will provide additional information (material) on the 
scale and timing of responses to shocks.  
We now perform the IFRs for the EAMZ. Using a Choleski decomposition on a VAR 
with ordering: 1) inflation/output, 2) a monetary policy variable; we compute impulse 
response functions (IRFs) for output and financial efficiency on the one hand, and for 
financial size and inflation on the other hand. While Figure 1 shows the dynamic responses 
(to shocks) between output and financial efficiency, Figure 2 depicts those between financial 
size and inflation. In the graphical representations of the IRFs, the dotted lines are the two 
standard deviation bands which are used to measure the significance (Agénor et al., 1997: 19). 
From the response of output to financial efficiency in Figure 1, it could be established that 
with a  positive shock in financial efficiency, output will significantly increase in the first 
year, then drop in the second year, level-up in the third-year before progressing the next two 
years to a long-term neutral position. This response is broadly consistent with the predictions 
of economic theory on the economic benefits of financial allocation efficiency.  From Figure 
2, a shock in financial size does not have a very significant effect on the temporary 
component of inflation during the first year, then a sharp deflation is witnessed during the 
second year, followed by a steep inflation in the third year from which point the effect is 
neutralized. While only one graph in either Figure 1 or Figure 2 has been discussed, the other 
graphs serve to confirm the general stability of the VAR models.  
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Figure 1: Financial System Efficiency and real GDP output (EAMZ) 
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Figure 2: Financial Size and Inflation (EAMZ) 
 
 
In order to ensure that our results and estimations are robust, the following have been 
performed or checked.  (1) But for financial size, for almost every financial variable (depth, 
efficiency or activity), two indicators have been employed.  Therefore, the findings have 
broadly encompassed measures of financial development from banking and financial system 
perspectives. (2) Both homogenous and heterogeneous assumptions have been considered in 
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the unit root tests. (3) Optimal lag selection for model specifications has been consistent with 
the goodness of fit recommendations of Liew (2004)
9
. (4) Granger causality has been 
performed both in level and first difference equations (for reasons already discussed). (5) 
Impulse response functions have been used to further examine the tendencies of significant 
Granger causality results.   
In the discussion of results, it would be interesting to examine the tested hypotheses in 
light of the findings before providing relevant policy implications.  
Hypothesis 1: Monetary policy variables affect prices in the long-run but not in the short-run 
in the proposed monetary zones.  
 Firstly, we have not been able to establish whether monetary policy variables affect 
prices in the long-term because the inflation variable has been stationary in levels. Thus, the 
absence of a chaotic inflation has limited the feasibility of any cointegration analysis between 
inflation and the monetary policy variables. Secondly, the overwhelming absence of any 
causality flowing from financial variables to prices in the short-term is consistent with the 
predictions of economic theory and the second part of Hypothesis 1. Hence, based on 
empirical validity, Hypothesis 1 is broadly true.  
Hypothesis 2: Monetary policy variables influence output in the short-term but not in the 
long-run in the proposed monetary zones. 
 Firstly, but for financial system efficiency (in the EAMZ), changes in monetary policy 
variables have barely any incidence on output in the short-run. Secondly, we have seen that 
                                                 
9
 “The major findings in the current simulation study are previewed as follows. First, these criteria managed to 
pick up the correct lag length at least half of the time in small sample. Second, this performance increases 
substantially as sample size grows. Third, with relatively large sample (120 or more observations), HQC is 
found to outdo the rest in correctly identifying the true lag length. In contrast, AIC and FPE should be a better 
choice for smaller sample. Fourth, AIC and FPE are found to produce the least probability of under estimation 
among all criteria under study. Finally, the problem of over estimation, however, is negligible in all cases. The 
findings in this simulation study, besides providing formal groundwork supportive of the popular choice of AIC 
in previous empirical researches, may as well serve as useful guiding principles for future economic researches 
in the determination of autoregressive lag length” (Liew, 2004:2).  
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financial variables are not cointegrated with real output. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is only 
partially correct; that is, with respect to the long-run neutrality of money.  
 Three main policy implications result from the findings above: the long-run neutrality 
of money and business cycles, credit expansions and inflationary tendencies (targeting) and, 
the manner in which the findings reconcile the ongoing debate.  
 On the implication for the long-run neutrality of money and business cycles, economic 
theory has traditionally suggested that monetary policy can affect the business cycle but not 
the long-run potential output. Despite theoretical and empirical consensus on money 
neutrality well documented in the literature, the role of money as an informational variable for 
monetary policy decisions has remained open to debate due to empirical works providing 
conflicting results. The long-run neutrality of money has been confirmed both for the WAMZ 
and the EAMZ. From a business cycle perspective, but for the effect of financial efficiency on 
output (in the EAMZ), the influence of monetary policy is not overwhelmingly apparent; 
confirming a study by Agénor et al. (2000) in two middle-income countries for which no 
evidence was found of Granger-causality flowing from money to output, regardless of the 
measures of money employed. The logical implication of this analysis is that while the EAMZ 
could use financial allocation efficiency as a short-term monetary policy instrument to 
influence its economic activity or the business cycle, the WAMZ does not have any monetary 
policy instrument for such a purpose among the financial variables assessed.  
 Looking at the implications for credit expansions and inflationary tendencies 
(targeting), there is a general consensus among analysts that significant money stock 
expansions that are not coupled with sustained credit improvements are less likely to have any 
inflationary effects. This position is broadly true in the long-run because monetary policy 
variables should theoretically have no incidence on prices in the short-term. From the 
hypotheses that have been investigated in the study, we could reframe the consensus into an 
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important question that policy makers are most likely to ask today: “would expansionary 
monetary policy in the proposed African embryonic zones exert any inflationary pressures on 
prices in the short-term?” The results broadly indicate monetary policy can be used in the 
short-run without affecting prices. This is an indirect suggestion that in the long-run, the 
monetary policy variables could be appropriate for inflation targeting.  
 On the concern of how the findings reflect the ongoing debate, the long-term effect 
(neutrality) of monetary policy on output and the overwhelming failure of financial variables 
to affect prices in the short-term are part of our findings that are consistent with the traditional 
discretionary monetary policy arrangements that favor commitments to price stability and 
international economic integration (like inflation-targeting and monetary unions respectively). 
Conversely, the absence of any short-run impact of monetary policy on output is consistent 
with the second strand of the debate which sustains that non-traditional policy regimes limit 
the ability of monetary authorities to use policy to offset output variations. This failure of 
monetary policy to affect short-term real GDP is in line with the postulation of Weeks (2010) 
who views the IMF oriented approach as absurdly inappropriate because a vast majority of 
governments in SSA countries do not have the necessary instruments to make monetary 
policy effective. Hence, based on the findings the monetary authority of the proposed WAMZ 
may not use policy instruments to offset adverse shocks to output by pursuing either an 
expansionary or a contractionary policy, while that of the EAMZ could do with the ‘financial 
allocation efficiency’ instrument.  
 The redeeming feature of the EAMZ is broadly in line with Mkenda (2001) who has 
used the GPPP model to analyze the suitability of the EAC for a single currency union and 
concluded that the EAMZ could be an optimal currency area. However the findings are 
generally more consistent with Buigut and Valev (2005) who have criticized the Mkenda 
(2001) approach for failing to distinguish errors from responses. Hence, it could be 
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established that our findings are in accordance with Buigut and Valev (2005) and Asongu 
(2012a) on the recommendation that further integration of the economies could lead to 
favorable conditions for a monetary union. The findings for the WAMZ are also consistent 
with recent literature that has established significant dissimilarities in the economic 
characteristics of member countries (Tsangarides and Qureshi, 2008) or substantial 
heterogeneity among the countries (Alagidede et al., 2011).  
 The main caveat in this study is that we have only considered financial intermediary 
performance determinants of output and inflation in the analysis. However, in the real world, 
economic activity from real output and inflation perspectives is endogenous to a complex set 
of variables: exchange rates, price controls, wages…etc. Thus, the interactions of financial 
depth, efficiency, activity and size with other determinants of economic activity could result 
in other dynamics of consumer price inflation and output. Hence, replication of the analysis 
with other fundamentals of economic activity in a multivariate VAR context would be 
interesting. Another relevant future research direction could be to assess whether the findings 
are relevant to country-specific cases of the sample. In so doing, policy makers could be 
enlightened more on which particular countries in the embryonic monetary zones need more 
work for monetary policy convergence.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 A major lesson of the EMU crisis is that serious disequilibria in a monetary union 
result from arrangements not designed to be robust to a variety of shocks. With the specter of 
this crisis looming substantially and scarring potential monetary zones, the present study has 
complemented existing literature by analyzing the effects of monetary policy on economic 
activity (output and prices) in the proposed African monetary unions. Findings  have broadly 
shown that: (1) but for financial efficiency in the EAMZ,  monetary policy variables affect 
output neither in the short-run nor in the long-term and; (2) with the exception of financial 
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size that impacts inflation in the EAMZ in the short-term, monetary policy variables generally 
have no effect on prices in the  short-run. Based on the results, the WAMZ may not use policy 
instruments to offset adverse shocks to output by pursuing either an expansionary or a 
contractionary policy, while the EAMZ could do with the ‘financial allocation efficiency’ 
instrument. Policy implications have been discussed.  
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